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POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION: WHY THE 
SECOND CIRCUIT’S UNDERSTANDING OF 
CERCLA § 113 SHOULD MAKE WAY FOR 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S PRO-SETTLEMENT 
HOLDING IN TRINITY INDUSTRIES 
SARAH M. GORDON* 
Abstract: The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has interpreted sec-
tion 113(f)(3)(B) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cleanup, and 
Liability Act, or CERCLA, to only allow a party to seek contribution for claims 
resolved under CERCLA itself, rather than claims resolved under a state statute. 
In Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit broke from Second Circuit precedent by holding that 
section 113(f)(3)(B) does not require a settlement under CERCLA to permit a 
contribution action pursuant to CERCLA. This Comment argues that the Third 
Circuit’s interpretation of section 113(f)(3)(B) is a more accurate reading of the 
plain language of the statute, a better interpretation of the legislative history of 
the contribution provision, and more consistent with the policy goals of the 
CERCLA regime than the interpretation put forth by the Second Circuit. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, as public awareness of the need to address toxic waste sites 
reached its zenith, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Cleanup, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).1 Through CERCLA,2 Con-
gress created a complex scheme to enforce environmental cleanups of haz-
ardous substances, and charged the Act’s administration to the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).3 CERCLA was designed to pass the costs of clean-
up on to the parties responsible for the pollution, known as potentially re-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–2015. 
 1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012); ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLI-
CY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 679–81 (4th ed. 2010); Superfund: CERCLA Overview, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/policy/cercla.htm (last updated Dec. 12, 
2011), archived at http://perma.cc/C6ZE-K6BX. 
 2 Superfund: CERCLA Overview, supra note 1. 
 3 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675; Superfund: Basic Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://
www.epa.gov/superfund/about.htm (last updated Dec. 24, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/
9CSK-EWL5; see PLATER ET AL., supra note 1, at 679–81. 
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sponsible parties (“PRPs”).4 CERCLA also created a “Superfund” to finance 
the cleanup operations, originally funded through the taxation of polluting 
industries, but presently funded with appropriations from the federal budget.5 
CERCLA plays a critical role in compelling the cleanup of toxins and 
hazardous waste, which, if left untreated, can have devastating health conse-
quences for both humans and wildlife.6 In 2013, in Trinity Industries, Inc. v. 
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
addressed the liability of PRPs for the cleanup of a site contaminated with 
manganese,7 which had the potential to enter the groundwater and to be in-
gested by humans, and lead, which had the potential to enter soil and surface 
water, and thus impact humans.8 Human exposure to either manganese or 
lead can have disastrous health consequences.9 CERCLA endeavors to pre-
vent such disastrous health consequences, which might otherwise result from 
the failure to clean up environmental contamination.10 
In 2008, Trinity Industries, Inc. and Trinity Railcar Corp. (together “Trin-
ity”) sued Chicago Bridge and Iron Company (“CBI”) for its share of the 
costs associated with the remediation of a contaminated industrial property 
                                                                                                                           
 4 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (establishing four categories of PRPs: (1) the current owner or operator 
of the facility or site; (2) past owners or operators of the site; (3) parties who arranged to have any 
hazardous substances disposed of or treated at the site; (4) parties who transported any hazardous 
substances to the site); PLATER ET AL., supra note 1, at 679–80, 686. 
 5 Martina E. Cartwright, Superfund: It’s No Longer Super and It Isn’t Much of a Fund, 18 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 299, 303–05 (2005); Kathleen Chandler Schmid, Note, The Depletion of the 
Superfund and Natural Resource Damages, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 483, 489, 511–12 (2008); see 
42 U.S.C. § 9611. 
 6 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THIS IS SUPERFUND: A COMMUNITY’S GUIDE TO EPA’S SU-
PERFUND PROGRAM 3 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/community/today/pdfs/
TIS%20FINAL%209.13.11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WE5C-Z65K. 
7 Manganese is a naturally occurring element that is found in rocks; it is used in steel produc-
tion to improve hardness and strength. Toxic Substances Portal - Manganese, AGENCY FOR TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxfaqs/tf.asp?id=101&tid=23 (last 
updated on Mar. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5HPP-8UK4. 
 8 See Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. (Trinity Industries II), 735 F.3d 131, 133 (3d 
Cir. 2013); Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. (Trinity Industries I), 867 F. Supp. 2d 754, 
758 (D. Pa. 2012) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 735 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 9 Human exposure to high levels of manganese in drinking water can damage the nervous 
system, leading to a syndrome resembling Parkinsonism. See DRINKING WATER SECTION, CONN. 
DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, MANGANESE IN DRINKING WATER 1 (n.d.), available at http://www.ct.
gov/dph/lib/dph/drinking_water/pdf/manganese.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6H3L-K87Z; Parkin-
somisms and Parkinson’s Plus Syndromes, PARKINSON’S DISEASE FOUND., http://www.pdf.org/
en/parkinsonism_parkinson_syndrome (last visited Mar. 3, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/
XJ6U-LT3B (detailing symptoms including tremors, rigidity, and postural instability). Similarly, 
human exposure to lead can cause a myriad of health problems, such as increased blood pressure, 
hearing and vision impairment, reproductive problems, damage to the brain and nervous system, 
anemia, liver and kidney damage, and even developmental delays or death in children. Superfund: 
Human Health and Lead, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/lead/health.
htm (last updated Nov. 25, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/LJ6N-JTB9. 
 10 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 6, at 3. 
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that CBI owned before Trinity purchased it.11 At the time, Trinity had settled 
its cleanup liability with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 2006, but not 
with the federal government.12 On appeal, the primary issue was whether a 
liability settlement under a state environmental statute was sufficient to allow 
Trinity to seek contribution from CBI under CERCLA, a federal statute.13 
In Trinity Industries, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
broke from Second Circuit precedent in Consolidated Edison Co. of New 
York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc. and W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Interna-
tional, Inc., by holding that CERCLA section 113(f)(3)(B) does not require a 
party to have settled its cleanup liability under CERCLA to be permitted to 
seek contribution from other PRPs pursuant to the statute.14 This Comment 
argues that the Third Circuit’s interpretation of section 113(f)(3)(B) is a more 
accurate reading of the plain language of the section, a better interpretation of 
the contribution provision’s legislative history, and in better accord with the 
policy goals of CERCLA, than the Second Circuit’s interpretation.15 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Between 1911 and 1985, CBI owned an industrial facility (“the site”) lo-
cated on a fifty-three-acre property in Greenville, Pennsylvania, where it con-
structed steel products such as storage tanks, pressure vessels, water towers, 
and bridge components.16 After CBI sold the site in 1985, several interim 
owners also conducted manufacturing operations there before Trinity pur-
chased it in November of 1988.17 Between 1988 and 2000, Trinity operated a 
railcar manufacturing facility on the site, constructing its railcars principally 
                                                                                                                           
 11 Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 133; Trinity Industries I, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 756; Plain-
tiff’s Original Complaint at 1, Trinity Industries I, 867 F. Supp. 2d 754 (No. 08CV01709) (show-
ing the original filing of complaint in 2008). 
 12 Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 133. 
 13 See id. at 135. 
 14 Id. at 136. 
 15 See infra notes 64–93 and accompanying text. As this Case Comment was being prepared 
to go to press, an analysis of the Trinity Industries II decision was published in a student Note in 
the Kentucky Journal of Equine, Agriculture, and Natural Resources Law. See Stephen F. Soltis, 
Note, Settlements as an Incentive to Procure Hazardous Waste Site Cleanup: The Third Circuit 
and a Broad Reading of CERCLA §113(f)(3)(b), 7 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC. & NAT. RESOURCES L. 
143 (2015). The case analysis undertaken in the Note parallels some of the analysis advanced 
here. See generally id. (containing at times similar, but not identical, analyses). 
 16 Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 134. 
 17 Trinity Industries I, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 757. Trinity is an industrial company that provides 
products and services to the energy, transportation, chemical, and construction sectors. About Us, 
TRINITY INDUS., http://www.trin.net/aboutus/default.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/598J-RHP8. 
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out of steel.18 Trinity has conceded that some of the paint used in its manufac-
turing processes spilled onto the ground at the site.19 
In June 2004, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania began investigating 
allegations that Trinity’s railcar manufacturing operation at the site had vio-
lated state environmental laws, including the Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act 
(“HSCA”).20 In March 2006, the Commonwealth filed civil and criminal 
charges against Trinity.21 Consequently, in December 2006, Trinity entered 
into a Consent Order and Agreement (the “Consent Order”) with the Penn-
sylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“PaDEP”), in which Trini-
ty agreed to remediate all environmental contamination at the site.22 The 
Consent Order included both Trinity’s admission that hazardous substances 
had been released at the site, and PaDEP’s finding that Trinity was a “respon-
sible person” under the HSCA.23 The Consent Order required Trinity to carry 
out remediation of the site through “Response Actions” that would be ap-
proved by and supervised by PaDEP.24 
After signing the Consent Order, Trinity sued CBI under CERCLA sec-
tion 113(f)(3)(B),25 seeking contribution for a share of the remediation costs, 
along with an injunction ordering CBI’s participation in the remediation ef-
forts.26 The district court granted CBI’s motion for summary judgment on 
Trinity’s section 113(f)(3)(B) claim, finding that the Consent Order did not 
resolve Trinity’s CERCLA liability.27 Left with no remedy under CERCLA to 
recover its response costs, Trinity appealed to the Third Circuit.28 On appeal, 
the federal government filed an amicus curiae brief to urge the court to inter-
pret section 113(f)(3)(B) in a way that would allow Trinity to seek contribu-
                                                                                                                           
 18 Trinity Industries I, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 757. 
 19 Id. Trinity disputed any connection between the paint spills or any other part of its railcar 
manufacturing process, and any environmental contamination of the site. Id. 
 20 Id. at 757–58; see 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 6020.101–6020.1305 (West 2013). 
 21 Trinity Industries I, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 757–58. The criminal charges included felony and 
misdemeanor counts for unlawful storage, transport, and disposal of hazardous waste. Id. In Octo-
ber 2006, Trinity pleaded nolo contendere to five misdemeanor counts of unlawful conduct. Id. 
 22 Id. at 758. 
 23 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6020.103; Trinity Industries I, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 758. 
 24 Trinity Industries I, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 758. 
 25 Section 113(f)(3)(B) addresses the rights of a party to seek contribution. Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1647–48 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2012)). 
 26 Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2013). Trinity also sued CBI for contribu-
tion under section 107(a), raising a distinct legal issue regarding the proper interpretation of that 
provision (another question of first impression for the Third Circuit, not discussed here). Trinity 
Industries I, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 759–60. The district court held that Trinity could not seek contri-
bution under section 107(a). Id. at 761. 
 27 Trinity Industries I, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 761–62. 
 28 Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 133; Trinity Industries I, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 761–62. 
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tion from other PRPs.29 The brief argued that Trinity had settled its liability 
for a response action under the meaning of CERCLA.30 Trinity also asserted 
that the Consent Order expressly reserved Trinity’s right to sue or seek other 
relief from any party not named in the Consent Order.31 
In Trinity Industries, the Third Circuit considered “whether CERCLA 
[section] 113(f)(3)(B) provides a contribution claim where the party seeking 
contribution has settled its state-law liability (as opposed to its liability under 
CERCLA).”32 Upon review, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
holding in part and vacated and remanded in part.33 It held that section 
113(f)(3)(B) “does not require resolution of CERCLA liability in particular,” 
as the statutory language of section 113(f)(3)(B) does not require that “the 
response action have been initiated pursuant to CERCLA.”34 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cleanup, and Liability 
Act (“CERCLA”) creates a “Superfund” to finance environmental cleanups 
and establishes wide-sweeping federal authority to respond to the release or 
threatened release of hazardous materials that could endanger public health or 
the environment.35 CERCLA includes provisions enforcing strict liability 
against parties identified as “responsible parties” for the release of hazardous 
                                                                                                                           
 29 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant at 17–22, Trinity Indus-
tries II, 735 F.3d 131 (No. 12-2059), 2012 WL 5817286, at *17–22. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 134. 
The Consent Order provides, in pertinent part, [n]othing in this Consent Order and 
Agreement “shall constitute or be construed as a release or covenant not to sue” any 
party that is not named in this Consent Order and Agreement. “Trinity expressly re-
serves the right to sue” any party that is not named in this Consent Order and 
Agreement. 
Id. 
 32 Id. at 135. The court also considered “whether injunctive relief pursuant to [Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) section] 7002(a)(1)(B) is available where a remediation 
plan has already been instituted and begun,” and “whether the District Court abused its discretion 
in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Trinity’s state-law claims once it had 
granted summary judgment to [CBI] on Trinity’s federal claims.” Id. This Comment only address-
es the legal implications of the CERCLA 113(f)(3)(B) interpretation issue. See infra notes 64–93 
and accompanying text. 
 33 Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 141. 
 34 Id. at 136. The court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to CBI 
regarding Trinity’s plea for injunctive relief under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B). Id. at 140. By 
remanding the CERCLA section 113(f)(3)(B) claim, the Third Circuit gave the district court an-
other opportunity to consider exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Trinity’s state-law claims. 
Id. at 141. 
 35 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012); Superfund: CERCLA Overview, supra note 1. 
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waste at contaminated sites.36 It also authorizes several types of response ac-
tions to clean up contaminated sites and to remediate any harm from the con-
tamination.37 
When CERCLA was originally passed in 1980, it did not contain a con-
tribution provision—an omission widely perceived and criticized as a legisla-
tive flaw.38 Congress sought to fix this flaw with the passage of the Super-
fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (“SARA”).39 SARA contains sec-
tion 113(f)(3)(B), which provides, “[a] person who has resolved its liability to 
the United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or 
all of the costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved set-
tlement may seek contribution . . . .”40 
After the creation of the federal “Superfund” under CERCLA, many 
states either revised existing environmental hazard response programs or cre-
ated their own state Superfund schemes.41 These programs were created to 
supplement federal funding or to fund the cleanup of sites that did not qualify 
for the CERCLA National Priorities List.42 Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Cartwright, supra note 5, at 306. See generally David W. Lannetti, Note, “Arranger Liabil-
ity” Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA): Judicial Retreat from Legislative Intent, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 279, 280 (1998) (argu-
ing that Congress intended for CERCLA to hold polluters to strict liability standards). But see 
generally Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative Analysis, 
20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 590 n.40 (1993) (describing problems with CERCLA’s con-
struction, and arguing for a narrow application of CERCLA’s strict liability provisions). 
 37 Superfund: CERCLA Overview, supra note 1. Specifically, CERCLA authorized two kinds 
of response actions: (1) short-term removals, where release or threatened release require a prompt 
response, and (2) long-term remedial response actions, designed to permanently reduce the harm 
associated with the release or threatened release of hazardous substances, where the harm is seri-
ous, but not immediately life threatening. Id. 
 38 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 113, 94 Stat. 2767, 2781 (1980), amended by An Act 
to extend and amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986); see Richard O. Faulk & Cynthia J. Bish-
op, There and Back Again: The Progression and Regression of Contribution Actions Under CER-
CLA, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 323, 324 (2005) (describing legislative history and the changing analy-
sis of CERCLA’s contribution provisions); Elizabeth F. Mason, Comment, Contribution, Contri-
bution Protection, and Nonsettlor Liability Under CERCLA: Following Laskin’s Lead, 19 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 75 (1991). 
 39 Mason, supra note 38, at 91–93; see Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1647–48 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B)). 
 40 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 100 Stat. at 1648. 
 41 See Elaine C. Warren, State Hazardous Waste Superfunds and CERCLA: Conflict or Com-
plement?, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,348, 10,348–60 (1983) (analyzing the relationship between state 
“superfund” statutes and CERCLA); see also Robert B. Mckinstry, Jr., The Role of State “Little 
Superfunds” in Allocation and Indemnity Actions Under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 93–96 (1994) (analyzing the 
relationship between Pennsylvania’s Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act and CERCLA). 
 42 Mckinstry, supra note 41, at 92–93; see John S. Applegate, How to Save the National Pri-
orities List from the D.C. Circuit—and Itself, 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 211, 212–25 
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Cleanup Act (“HSCA”)43 and Land Recycling and Environmental Remedia-
tion Standards Act (“LRA”)44 are two such state environmental response stat-
utes.45 
At least three federal circuit courts of appeal have considered whether a 
party must settle its cleanup liability pursuant to CERCLA in order to then 
sue for contribution under CERCLA section 113(f)(3)(B).46 A clear circuit 
split has arisen between the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
and the Third Circuit.47 Beyond the Second and Third Circuits, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and district courts across the country have 
also struggled to interpret section 113(f)(3)(B), with conflicting results.48 
                                                                                                                           
(1994) (describing the relationship between CERCLA enforcement and the NPL); National Priori-
ties List (NPL), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl (last updated 
Oct. 16, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/CV59-FJDE (noting that the NPL is the EPA’s list of 
national priorities among the known or threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, 
and contaminants in the United States). 
 43 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 6020.101–6020.1305 (West 2013). The HSCA gives PaDEP the 
funding and authority to conduct cleanup actions at sites where environmental contamination has 
occurred. Id.; Hazardous Sites Cleanup Program, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., 
www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/hazardous_sites_cleanup_program/20600 (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3JBU-6XDA. It also gives PaDEP the authority 
to force those parties responsible for the release of hazardous substances to fund and conduct 
cleanup actions or to repay any public funds spent on such cleanup. Hazardous Sites Cleanup 
Program, supra. HSCA also allows Pennsylvania to participate in the cleanup of Pennsylvania 
sites under CERCLA. Id. Further, the HSCA liability scheme is modeled after CERCLA and is 
comparable to the CERCLA liability scheme. Mckinstry, supra note 41, at 93–94; Thomas J. El-
liott, Environmental Law, 61 PA. B. ASS’N Q., Jan. 1990, at 13, 13–14. The Third Circuit has 
found that a defendant’s liability “is neither greater nor lesser under the HSCA” because “the cost 
recovery and contribution provisions in HSCA are virtually identical to those in CERCLA.” Agere 
Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 236 (3d Cir. 2010). Like the HSCA, the 
LRA also “bears a strong resemblance to CERCLA.” Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron 
Co. (Trinity Industries II), 735 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 44 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6026.101–908 (West 2012). 
 45 Mckinstry, supra note 41, 93–96; Warren, supra note 41, 10,348–60; see Thomas G. Kess-
ler, Comment, The Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act: Pennsylvania 
Tells CERCLA Enough Is Enough, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 161, 180–86 (1997) (arguing that the LRA 
addresses problems with CERCLA, encouraging development of previously contaminated sites). 
 46 See infra notes 49–63 and accompanying text. 
 47 See infra notes 49–63 and accompanying text. 
 48 See ITT Indus., Inc. v. BorgWarner, Inc., 506 F.3d 452, 459–61 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
plaintiff could not seek contribution under section 113(f)(3)(B) because the consent order it entered 
into with the EPA did not constitute a settlement under that section); Differential Dev.-1994, Ltd. v. 
Harkrider Distrib. Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 727, 738–43 (D. Tex. 2007); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City 
of Lodi, Cal., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210–12 (D. Cal. 2003); Michael K. Murphy & Jessica Green-
ston, CERCLA in the Post-Atlantic Research World: Some Emerging Questions, 20 A.B.A. ENVTL. 
LITIGATOR, no. 2, Spring 2009, at 1, 4–5, available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
Documents/Murphy-Greenston-CERCLAInPostAtlanticResearchWorld.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/MUA8-46K7 (describing the emerging circuit split regarding interpretation of CERCLA 
section 113(f)(3)(B)). Compare Differential, 470 F. Supp. 2d at 738–43 (holding that plaintiff could 
not seek contribution under section 113(f)(3)(B) because the cleanup agreement entered into with a 
state environmental agency did not resolve plaintiff’s CERCLA liability, and was thus not a settle-
48 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:E. Supp. 
In 2005, in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, 
Inc., the Second Circuit interpreted CERCLA section 113(f)(3)(B) as only 
allowing contribution for claims resolved under CERCLA itself, rather than 
claims resolved under a state statute.49 In this case, a utility company sued the 
former operator of a manufactured gas plant, seeking contribution under 
CERCLA for response costs it incurred in the cleanup of environmental con-
tamination.50 Plaintiff argued that the “Voluntary Cleanup Agreement” it had 
entered into with the New York Department of Environmental Conservation 
constituted an administrative settlement under section 113(f)(3)(B), and that it 
was therefore eligible to seek contribution from other potentially responsible 
parties (“PRPs”) under this provision.51 The Second Circuit held that “section 
113(f)(3)(B) . . . create[s] a contribution right only when liability for CER-
CLA claims, rather than some broader category of legal claims, [are] resolved 
. . . because resolution of liability for ‘response action[s]’ is a prerequisite to a 
section 113(f)(3)(B) suit[,] and a ‘response action’ is a CERCLA-specific term 
. . . .”52 The court based its holding in part on its reading of the legislative 
history of SARA.53 Specifically, it relied on a passage from the Report of the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce.54 
In 2009, in W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos International, Inc., the 
Second Circuit decision reaffirmed its interpretation section 113(f)(3)(B) of 
CERCLA.55 In this case—on facts similar to Consolidated Edison—the Sec-
ond Circuit held that the plaintiff’s consent order with a state agency did not 
resolve CERCLA claims under the meaning of section 113(f)(3)(B), and the 
plaintiff therefore could not seek contribution from other PRPs under that 
                                                                                                                           
ment under that section), with Fireman’s Fund, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 1210–12 (holding that plaintiff 
could seek contribution because the cooperative agreement it had entered into with a state agency did 
constitute a settlement under section 113(f)(3)(B)). 
 49 423 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 50 Id. at 92–93. 
 51 Id. at 95–96. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 96. 
 54 Id.; H.R. REP. 99-253, at 79–80 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861–62. In 
pertinent part, the report states, 
It has been held that, when joint and several liability is imposed under section 106 or 
107 of the Act, a concomitant right of contribution exists under CERCLA . . . . Oth-
er courts have recognized that a right to contribution exists without squarely ad-
dressing the issue . . . . This section clarifies and confirms the right of a person held 
jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other poten-
tially liable parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a share of the 
cleanup or cost that may be greater than its equitable share under the circumstances. 
H.R. REP. 99-253, at 79–80. 
 55 559 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2009); see Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 95–97. 
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section.56 The court based its holding on the same statutory interpretation that 
it did in Consolidated Edison, and on the additional concern that the party 
would still face a CERCLA action brought by the EPA.57 
In 1993, in United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., the Third Circuit consid-
ered whether the United States could recover costs it had incurred overseeing 
a cleanup in accordance with a Consent Order issued pursuant to Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) section 3008(h).58 In Rohm & 
Haas, the defendants argued that RCRA and CERCLA represent two different 
statutory schemes, and therefore, remediation costs incurred under RCRA are 
not recoverable under CERCLA section 107.59 They argued this despite the 
fact that the costs would qualify as removal costs under CERCLA, and would 
have been recoverable had the Consent Order been agreed to pursuant to a 
CERCLA action.60 The Third Circuit was not persuaded by this argument, 
however, and found that the plain language of section 107(a) allows the gov-
ernment to recover “all costs of removal,” without qualification.61 According-
ly, and further due to the similarity between CERCLA and RCRA, the court 
reasoned that the United States could recover costs incurred pursuant to 
RCRA, under CERCLA.62 The Third Circuit also clarified the policy benefits 
of treating remediation actions under RCRA as removal actions under CER-
CLA, and in particular, stressed the ability to take full advantage of two stat-
utes similarly designed to force parties to undertake “corrective activity.”63 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that section 113(f)(3)(B) of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CER-
CLA”) “does not require resolution of CERCLA liability in particular,” as the 
plain language of section 113(f)(3)(B) does not specify that “the response 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See W.R. Grace, 559 F.3d at 90; Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 92–93. 
 57 W.R. Grace, 559 F.3d at 90–91; Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 95–96. 
 58 2 F.3d 1265, 1267, 1274–75 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by United States v. 
E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. Inc., 432 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 59 Id. at 1274. 
 60 Id. at 1274–75. “We find no support in the text or legislative history of CERCLA for the 
suggestion that identical oversight activity on the part of the government should be considered a 
removal if the government invokes CERCLA, but not a removal if other statutory authority is 
invoked.” Id. at 1275. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 1274–78. The court, however, held that the United States could not recover costs in 
this case, as the oversight activity in question did not fall under CERCLA’s definition of removal. 
Id. 
 63 See id. at 1275. 
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action have been [sic] initiated pursuant to CERCLA.”64 Thus, a response 
action that has been initiated pursuant to a state statute is sufficient to allow a 
responsible party to seek contribution from other potentially responsible par-
ties (“PRPs”) in the Third Circuit.65 The Third Circuit’s holding is in direct 
opposition to the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
in Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. UGI Utilities, Inc.66 In that case, 
the Second Circuit interpreted section 113(f)(3)(B) as only allowing contribu-
tion for claims settled under CERCLA itself, rather than claims settled under 
a state statute.67 The Third Circuit’s interpretation of section 113(f)(3)(B), 
however, reflects a more accurate analysis of the legislative history, is more 
consistent with the plain meaning of the section, and is better suited for ac-
complishing the policy goals of CERCLA.68 
The Trinity Industries holding reflects a more accurate reading of the 
legislative history of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 
1986 (“SARA”), which enacted section 113(f)(3)(B).69 The court in Consoli-
dated Edison relied on a passage from a House sub-committee report that 
refers to claims under CERCLA section 113(f)(1), not claims under section 
113(f)(3)(B).70 The passage is only salient for the interpretation of section 
113(f)(1) as it relates to sections 106 and 107, and specifically to whether or 
not CERCLA was intended to impose joint and several liability on PRPs—an 
entirely separate issue from the interpretation of 113(f)(3)(B) contributory 
liability.71 This passage, and the Consolidated Edison holding that erroneous-
ly relied on it, should not, therefore, be applied to an interpretation of section 
113(f)(3)(B).72 
The Third Circuit’s interpretation of section 113(f)(3)(B) in Trinity In-
dustries not only avoids the Second Circuit’s flawed reading of the legislative 
history, but also is more consistent with the plain language of the statute.73 As 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Trinity Indus., Inc. v. Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. (Trinity Industries II), 735 F.3d 131, 136 (3d 
Cir. 2013); see Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2012). 
 65 See Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 136–37; supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 66 See Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 136; Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils., 
Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 95–96 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 67 Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 90, 95–96. 
 68 See infra notes 69–93 and accompanying text. 
 69 See H.R. REP. 99-253, at 79–80 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861–62; 
supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text; infra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 70 Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 135–36 (citing Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 95–96); 
see H.R. REP. 99-253, at 79–80; supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 71 See Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 135–36. 
 72 See supra notes 69–71, and accompanying text. 
 73 See Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 135–36; Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 
(2005). “[W]hen the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” Dodd, 545 
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the Third Circuit held, the plain language of section 113(f)(3)(B) only re-
quires a party to have “resolv[ed its] liability to the United States or a state 
‘for some or all of a response action’” in order to seek contribution.74 Section 
113(f)(3)(B) does not require the response action to have been initiated under 
CERCLA; Congress could have easily written such a requirement into the 
statute, had that been its intent.75 
At the urging of the federal government, the Third Circuit also dismissed 
the Second Circuit’s concern that a PRP that had settled its liability under a 
state environmental statute could still face a CERCLA action brought by the 
federal government.76 In W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos International Inc., 
the Second Circuit raised the concern that, as the PRP had not faced a CER-
CLA action prior to seeking contribution from other PRPs, there was still an 
“open . . . possibility” that the PRP could face a CERCLA action brought by 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or an equivalent state agency.77 
As the potential for such an action remains a hypothetical possibility, the Sec-
ond Circuit reasoned that the PRP could not have resolved its liability to the 
federal government under section 113(f)(3)(B), even if the PRP has settled its 
liability under a CERCLA-equivalent state statute.78 In its amicus curiae 
brief, the federal government urged the Third Circuit not to adopt this flawed 
interpretation of section 113(f)(3)(B), arguing that a party, having settled with 
a state agency to undertake response actions, is not likely to then be sued ei-
ther by the state or federal government under CERCLA.79 
Finally, the Third Circuit’s approach is well suited for accomplishing 
CERCLA’s policy goals.80 As the Third Circuit established in United States v. 
Rohm & Haas Co., it will interpret CERCLA provisions in light of the stat-
ute’s broader policy goals.81 The court in Rohm & Haas considered whether 
the United States could recover costs it had incurred overseeing a cleanup in 
accordance with a RCRA section 3008(h) Consent Order.82 The Third Circuit 
held that the plain language of section 107(a) allows the government to re-
                                                                                                                           
U.S. at 359 (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 
(2000)). 
 74 Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 136–37. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See id.; Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra note 29, 
at 25–26. 
 77 Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 136 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Zotos Int’l, Inc., 
559 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
 78 See id. 
 79 Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, supra note 29, at 19, 
25–26. 
 80 Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 137–38; United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 
1275 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 81 See 2 F.3d at 1275. 
 82 Id. at 1267, 1274. 
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cover “all costs of removal,” and therefore the United States could recover 
costs incurred under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), if 
the remediation actions taken met the CERCLA criteria for removal actions.83 
In so holding, the Third Circuit discussed the policy benefits of treating re-
mediation actions under RCRA as removal actions under CERCLA, in order 
to take full advantage of two similar statutes, both designed to force parties to 
take corrective action.84 The reasoning from Rohm & Haas further bolsters 
the Third Circuit’s interpretation of section 113(f)(3)(B) in Trinity Industries, 
because both cases promote the cleanup of hazardous waste sites through a 
broad and practical reading of the statute, thus furthering the policy goals of 
CERCLA.85 
The Third Circuit’s interpretation of section 113(f)(3)(B) is in accord 
with the primary purpose of CERCLA: to encourage the “clean up [of] haz-
ardous waste sites.”86 In order to achieve this goal, and thereby protect human 
health,87 CERCLA is intended to “encourage private parties to assume the 
financial responsibility of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery from 
others.”88 Private parties have a greater incentive to assume the initial finan-
cial responsibility for a cleanup if they have the ability to seek contribution 
from other PRPs.89 
For CERCLA to function and effectuate cleanup of contaminated sites, 
private parties must be encouraged to settle with state authorities and take on 
financial responsibility for cleanups.90 By permitting private parties to seek 
contribution for cleanups under 113(f)(3)(B), without settling their liability 
under CERCLA, the Third Circuit’s approach encourages settlement, further-
ing CERCLA’s aims of promoting timely and efficient site cleanup and reme-
diation, and thus protecting human health and the environment.91 The Second 
Circuit’s interpretation might incentivize private parties, such as Trinity In-
dustries, to resist entering into cleanup settlements with the state, and to in-
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. at 1274. 
 84 Id. at 1275. 
 85 See Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 135–38; Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d at 1275; infra 
notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
 86 Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d at 1270; see Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 135–38. 
 87 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 6, at 3. 
 88 Agere Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Envtl. Tech. Corp., 602 F.3d 204, 226 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 n.13 (1994)). 
 89 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012); H.R. REP. 99-253, at 80 (1985); supra note 4 and accom-
panying text. 
 90 See Trinity Industries II, 735 F.3d at 136–38; Eric DeGroff, Raiders of the Lost Arco: Re-
solving the Partial Settlement Credit Issue in Private Cost Recovery and Contribution Claims 
Under CERCLA, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 332, 361 (2000); Joanna M. Fuller, Note, The Sanctity of 
Settlement: Stopping CERCLA’s Volunteer Remediators from Sidestepping the Settlement Bar, 34 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 227, 265–66 (2009). 
 91 See supra notes 64–90 and accompanying text. 
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stead wait for the filing of federal civil actions against them, to ensure their 
rights to seek contribution under section 113(f)(3)(b) are preserved.92 Several 
district courts have adopted the Consolidated Edison holding, and, as a result, 
a number of plaintiffs who have settled with state agencies have been pre-
vented from seeking contribution from other PRPs under CERCLA.93  
CONCLUSION 
In Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., Trinity Indus-
tries Inc., owner of a manufacturing site contaminated with manganese, sued 
Chicago Bridge and Iron Company, the former owner of the site, under sec-
tion 113(f)(3)(B) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Cleanup, 
and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), seeking contribution for a share of the reme-
diation costs. Trinity had previously entered into a settlement agreement with 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, under a state environmental remediation 
statute, but had not yet been charged under the federal statute. The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that section 113(f)(3)(B) does not re-
quire a party to have previously settled its liability in a federal CERCLA ac-
tion in order to be allowed to seek contribution from other potentially respon-
sible parties (“PRPs”). The Third Circuit’s holding broke with precedent set 
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Consolidated Edison 
Co. of New York, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., where the Second Circuit inter-
preted section 113(f)(3)(B) as being limited to contribution actions for claims 
resolved under CERCLA itself, rather than claims resolved under a state stat-
ute. 
This Comment argues that the Third Circuit’s holding in Trinity Indus-
tries offers a clear explanation of why section 113(f)(3)(B) does not require a 
party to have previously settled its cleanup liability in a federal CERCLA ac-
tion, as opposed to an equivalent state action, in order to be allowed to seek 
contribution from other PRPs pursuant to CERCLA. The holding, which re-
lies an analysis of the plain language of the statute, the legislative history, and 
a consideration of the policy goals of CERCLA, can and should help to guide 
other circuits and district courts around the country that are struggling to in-
terpret section 113(f)(3)(B). The Third Circuit’s interpretation encourages 
private parties to settle with state agencies under state CERCLA statutes, ra-
ther than CERCLA itself, thus relieving some of the burden for environmen-
tal cleanup from the federal government. The decision further allows for more 
efficient remediation of hazardous sites, in furtherance of the original legisla-
tive intent behind CERCLA. 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See supra notes 64–90 and accompanying text. 
 93 See Differential Dev.-1994, Ltd. v. Harkrider Distrib. Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 727, 740–43 
(D.Tex. 2007); Waukesha v. Viacom Int’l Inc., 404 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1115 (D.Wis. 2005). 
